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19 Rovember 1981

| | MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel | |
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| | SUBJECT : Agency Military Reserve Units | |
| | 1. The Agency Reserve units were established in the 1950's based on a strong belief that military personnel would be required during any emergency or a full mobilization. The Agency had great numbers of World War II and Korean veterans, as civilian employees, who were holding reserve commissions. Any mobilization at this time would have created havoc for the Agency unless a mechanism existed within the Agency for their active participation in the military reserves and for any future mobilization. Many of these reservists were in key positions and they had a vested interest of 8 to 12 years in the military reserves. Coupled with this group was a half hearted attempt to establish war plans for the utilization of Agency reservists. The plans cited large numbers of military personnel that would be needed upon mobilization and these figures were impressive. Another consideration was the Draft and the Agency was hiring numerous people with military reserve obligations and they were accommodated in these reserve units with a mobilization assignment to the Agency. Throughout these years the Agency Reserve units have functioned "ather smoothly and they were secure reserve assignments for those who desired to remain active. (U) | • , |
| | 2. The benefits to the Agency for sponsoring these units include complete career control (civilian/military) over the individual reservist. Any cover or security considerations can be handled without difficulty. Another benefit the Agency gains is the related experience of active duty military training received by these people. Although difficult to pin-point any component gaining a precise benefit, collectively this training, in many cases, ties in with the individual's civilian position. Perhaps the strongest benefit to the Agency is the availability of a pool of individuals with expertise in both the Agency and military operations for utilization in any mobilization. Tied with these benefits is a side product of public relations and the contribution Agency reservists make to their respective military service. (U) | |
| | 3. Despite the benefits there are minor problems for the Agency associated with the reserve units. Covert and overt people are mixed together in their military active and inactive duty training. Covert personnel are known to military departments. Military records maintained by the services reflect unit designation and can easily be traced back to Agency ties. The longer Agency | 25X1 |
| , | WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED | |

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| units exist the greater the risk of compromise of covert personnel. The training and administration of Agency reserve units and personnel creates minor problems for the Agency. Initially, when the Agency activated these units the training consisted of primarily unconventional warfare subjects. Then it progressed to counterinsurgency and eventually drifted into a general subjects program. | |
| 4. The military departments have demonstrated a casual interest with the Agency's reserve units but would support any reasonable request from the Agency to maintain the units. They seldom questioned or requested justification for the units. Perhaps the absence of computers and the war in Vietnam contributed to a lack of interest and a more thorough review of how the Agency was utilizing military reserves and how they planned to use them in a wartime situation. (U) | |
| 5. There are no specific wartime plans to justify the Agency sponsored reserve units. The plans do not exist and without an approved Agency-JCS plan or agreement as to how, where, and why military reservists would be utilized during wartime the units cannot be justified nor should they be supported by the military departments. (U) | |
| 6. After heavily weighing all known facts and based on my close association with both the Agency and Military Departments, and considering the guidelines for this paper, it would be my recommendation to discontinue the Agency's Military Reserve Program. The discontinuation would create individual problems for the reservists but they would not be penalized because of the numerous training opportunities available with other military reserve units. The premise that any Agency reservist mobilized with an outside Reserve unit will be lost to the Agency during mobilization is questionable. The Military has an excellent record of assigning military personnel to this Agency on a by-name basis. The same would be done in any emergency. In any event, the total assigned reserve strength if lost to the military certainly would not create a catastrophe for the Agency. Incidentally, the numbers keep going down. (U) | |
| Reserve Program. His comments and interest in retaining these reserve units were appreciated and carefully considered. Notwithstanding his strong interest and his suggestion that plans would be prepared and sent to JCS within six months to justify the retention of these units, I would recommend that Agency Military Reserve Units, including Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force be discontinued no later than 1 October 1982. It will take time for Agency reservists to locate suitable outside reserve assignments. Military Reserve Headquarters are equipped to handle reassignments expeditiously. I see no major problems for MPB in locating suitable assignments for Agency reservists by working closely with these reserve headquarters. However, an early decision should be made on this recommendation in order to have the lead time for MPB to affect changes by 1 October 1982. The thinking of the 1950's for mobilization has changed dramatically for the 1980's and to prolong the existence of these units will | 5X1 |

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only postpone the decision to terminate them. (U)